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Abstract 
This dissertation comprises of three essays in industrial economics. My first essay 
analyzes social efficiency of entry into a downstream oligopoly of a vertical market structure, 
where an upstream supplier sells an essential input to all firms producing downstream.  In the 
downstream markets, a multiproduct firm is both a monopoly in its own product and a leader in a 
different product market with free entry of followers.  We show that in the presence of scale 
economies, entry is socially insufficient.  The insufficiency of entry is due to the fact that entry 
generates a business-creating effect significantly large enough to dominate a business-stealing 
effect, regardless of whether the upstream supplier's input pricing strategy is discriminatory or 
uniform.  This suggests that entry regulation as a public policy is socially undesirable in the 
downstream oligopoly of a vertical market structure. 
My second essay examines differences in welfare implications between discriminatory 
and uniform input price regimes in vertically related markets where a multiproduct firm operates 
downstream in two separate markets: one is a monopoly and the other is an oligopoly with entry 
of new firms.  In the analysis, we analyze how the downstream entry into the oligopolistic 
market affects social efficiency.  In an open economy, whether the input price regime is 
discriminatory or uniform, entry is always socially excessive in the presence of scale economies. 
This contrasts with the existing studies in the literature that entry is always socially insufficient 
in an open economy with the presence of scale economies. 
Focusing on the scenario where vertically integrated producer (VIP) adopts a non-
foreclosure strategy, my third essay shows that downstream entry is socially insufficient despite 
scale economies and the marginal cost difference between the VIP and its retail competitors.  
The non-foreclosure equilibrium arises when the VIP's wholesale profit from the sales of an 
  
essential input is sufficiently large and the VIP shares the profit with its downstream 
competitors.  For the case of an open economy where the VIP is a foreign firm, downstream 
entry continues to be socially insufficient.  Entry regulation is therefore socially undesirable, but 
a production subsidy encouraging downstream entry is shown to be a welfare-improving policy. 
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Chapter 1 - Social Efficiency of Downstream Entry in Vertically  
Related Markets with Multiproduct Leaders 
1.1 Introduction 
Whether entry into a market is socially excessive or not constitutes an important 
regulatory issue to governments or policy makers of many countries.1  Economists have helped 
identify a set of primary variables that determine the welfare implications of entry under 
imperfect competition.  These variables include the presence of scale economies, market 
structure (in terms of the number of firms), competition models adopted by rival firms, as well as 
differences in marginal costs of production between competing firms, etc.  The seminal 
contribution by Mankiw and Whinston (1986) indicates that under oligopoly with no integer 
constraint, the presence of scale economies makes entry socially excessive.  Ghosh and Morita 
(2007) demonstrate for the case of a successive vertical oligopoly that free entry equilibrium can 
be socially insufficient rather than excessive.  Herweg and Muller (2012) show that entry can be 
either socially insufficient or excessive, depending on whether there is input price discrimination 
and whether the number of firms in the downstream industry is exogenously given.  Mukerjee 
(2012) shows that in the absence of scale economies, entry is always socially insufficient.  In the 
presence of scale economies, Mukerjee (2012) further indicates that entry remains to be socially 
insufficient when the marginal cost differential between market leader and followers is 
significantly large. 
 In this paper, we examine social efficiency of downstream entry in vertically related 
markets.  Specifically, we analyze and compare effects that alternative input pricing regimes 
(discriminatory vs. uniform) have on downstream entry in order to see if entry is socially 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Suzumura and Kiyono (1987) and Suzumura (1995). 
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excessive or insufficient.  As in Mukerjee (2012), we pay special attention to competition 
between a market leader and followers.  But unlike Mukerjee (2012), we consider that a market 
leader is a multiproduct firm in both of the downstream output markets.  We further examine the 
scenario where an upstream input monopolist supplies an essential input to all firms producing 
downstream. In the downstream markets, a multiproduct firm is both a monopoly in its own 
product and a leader in a different product market with free entry of followers.  The upstream 
monopolist may adopt a discriminatory pricing strategy by charging different input prices 
between the multiproduct firm and the followers.  Alternatively, the upstream monopolist may 
adopt a uniform pricing strategy for its input, charging an identical price to all downstream 
buyers.  We wish to see whether differences in input pricing regimes affect the welfare 
implications of downstream entry differently.   
It should be mentioned that the standard logic behind price concessions is applied to input 
pricing determined by an upstream monopolist supplier.  This implies that downstream firms 
whose markets have lower demands are apt to receive an input price concession.  Thus, when 
one market has higher demand than another market, under input price discrimination the 
multiproduct firm (the leader) would receive input price concession.  That is, the input price for 
the multiproduct firm is lower than that for the followers.  On the other hand, under uniform 
input pricing, if the oligopolistic market with free entry has a higher demand than the monopoly 
market, the input price for the multiproduct firm (the leader) will be higher than that for the firm 
under input price discrimination.  This is because the price concession is applied to all firms 
equally.  However the downstream followers will get a lower input price under uniform input 
pricing than under input price discrimination.  The pros and corns between uniform pricing and 
price discrimination upon social welfare have long been debated. Arya and Mittendorf (2010) 
3 
show that input price discrimination can provide welfare gains by giving price concessions to 
less efficient firms. They indicate that when markets have lower demand and lower competition, 
price discrimination stifles the social efficiency by shifting output to less competitive markets. 
This notion contrasts to Bork’s (1978) defending about price discrimination and concludes that 
the uniform pricing can offer significant welfare benefits.  Whereas Katz (1987), Yoshida (2000) 
and Valletti (2003) also support the notion that price discrimination can provide welfare benefits 
by siphoning the production to the less efficient sources. 
Apart from two alternative input pricing regimes, it is instructive to see economic reasons 
behind the insufficient and excessive entry. There are two effects associated with entry: one is a 
business-stealing effect and the other is a business-creating effect.  A business-stealing effect 
arises when entry steals business from an incumbent which suffers a loss in the volume of sales.  
On the other hand, a business-creating effect emerges when entry creates business to an 
incumbent by increasing its volume of sales.  From the perspective of a social planner, every 
business system has both business-stealing and business-creating effects associated with entry.  It 
is important to identify conditions under which one effect dominates the other.  If entry is such 
that the business-stealing effect is dominated by the business-creating effect, entry is deemed to 
be socially insufficient.  On the contrary, if the business-stealing effect dominates the business-
creating effect, such entry is socially excessive.  In our analysis, we consider the case that all 
firms in the downstream oligopolistic market incur set-up costs and that the upstream input 
supplier adopts either a discriminatory or a uniform pricing scheme.  We show that the business-
stealing effect is dominated by the business-creating effect, with the consequence that entry into 
the downstream oligopoly of a vertical market structure is socially insufficient.  We therefore 
4 
infer that downstream entry regulation is not socially effective from the welfare maximization 
perspective.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the model of 
a vertically related market structure.  In Section 1.3, we discuss welfare implications of 
downstream entry when the upstream input supplier adopts either a discriminatory or a uniform 
input pricing scheme.  Section 1.4 concludes. 
 
1.2 The Simple Model of Vertically Related Markets 
We consider a simple vertical structure in which there is an upstream monopoly supplier 
selling an essential input to all firms producing downstream.  In the downstream markets, a 
multiproduct firm is a Stackelberg leader in an oligopolistic market for a homogenous good 
(denoted as )A  and is a monopoly in its own product (denoted as ).B   There are potential 
entrants wanting to produce good .A   If an entrant decides to enter the oligopolistic market, it 
incurs a fixed cost ( 0),k   and behaves as a Stackelberg follower.  We wish to examine welfare 
implications of entry into the downstream oligopolistic market of a vertical structure.   
For analytical simplicity, we assume that the production cost of the upstream monopoly 
supplier is zero and that all firms in the downstream markets require one unit of the essential 
input to produce one unit of output.  We further assume that the leader and followers in the 
oligopolistic market incur set-up costs and that all the followers in this market are identical in all 
aspects. 
The (inverse) demand in the downstream oligopolistic market is assumed to be linear:
1
,
n
A A L i
i
P q q

    where AP  is price of product A , and Lq
and 
i
q  are the quantities of the good 
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produced by the leader and the ith follower (i = 1,…, n) respectively,
A
  represents the size or 
demand of the market.  The (inverse) demand in the downstream monopoly market is taken to 
be: ,
B B L
P y   where 
B
P  and Ly  are the price and quantity of product ,B  and B  represents its 
market size or demand.  
Two alternative pricing schemes may be adopted by the upstream supplier selling an 
essential input, .X   One is discriminatory pricing, under which one input price 
L
w  is charged to 
the multiproduct leader and another input price 
i
w  is charged to each of the followers in the 
oligopolistic market, where .
L i
w w   The other is uniform pricing, under which an identical price 
w  is charged to all input buyers.  
The analysis involves a three-stage game.  At stage one, the upstream input monopolist 
sets its prices that maximize total profits.  At stage two, the multiproduct leader makes its output 
decisions to maximize joint profits from the two downstream markets.  At stage three, each 
entrant as a follower in the oligopolistic market determines its output to maximize individual 
profit.  In what follows, we employ backward induction to solve for the subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium for each input pricing scheme.  
 
1.2.1 Downstream Entry under Input Price Discrimination 
Under this regime, discriminatory input prices are charged to the multiproduct leader and 
each follower in the oligopolistic market.  Given input price ,
i
w  the 
thi  follower at the third stage 
of the game chooses output 
i
q  to maximize its total profit, assuming that the leader’s output 
L
q  
and the outputs of all other followers remain unchanged.  The profit maximization problem of 
the 
thi  follower is: 
6 
 
 
1
 .
n
ii A L i i
iqi
Max kq q qw 

    
 
Solving for the optimal output level of the 
thi  follower yields 
1
A L i
i
q w
q
n
  


 for 1,..., .i n                (1) 
Given a different input price ,
L
w  the multiproduct leader at the second stage of the game 
solves the joint profit maximization problem: 
{ , } 1
 [( ) ] ( ) ,
n
A L L L B L L Li
q y i
L
L L
Max q w q y w y kq  

                      
where 
i
q  is given in (1). Under the assumption of symmetry that followers are identical in all 
aspects, we solve for the leader's equilibrium outputs:                 
 1
,
2
A L i
L
w n nw
q
   
               (2a) 
.
2
B L
L
w
y
 
                                                                                                     (2b) 
Using (1) and (2a), we calculate output of each follower as  
   
 
2 1
.
2 1
A i L
i
w n w n
q
n
    


                                                                             (2c) 
From (2a) and (2c), we see that an increase in 
i
w  raises the output of the leader and lowers the 
output of each follower.  Similarly, an increase in
L
w  raises the output of each follower and 
lowers the output of the multiproduct leader. 
At the first stage of the game, the upstream input monopolist determines an optimal 
pricing structure, { , },
L i
w w  by solving the following profit maximization problem:    
 
s
,
 ( ) ,L L L L i i
w wL i
Max w q w y nw q                                                                                         
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where 
, ,L Lq y  and iq are respectively given in (2a), (2b), and (2c).  The first-order conditions 
with respect to 
L
w  and 
i
w  lead to the optimal input prices:   
   
 
2 1 2
,
2 3 4
A BPD
L
n n
w
n
   


                                                         (3a)  
   
 
2 3 1
,
2 3 4
A BPD
i
n n
w
n
   


                                                                               (3b) 
where the subscript “PD” represents the case of input price discrimination.  Under discriminatory 
pricing, the optimal input prices reflect a two-fold averaging across both downstream markets 
and firms.2  
Substituting the input prices from (3a)-(3b) back into (2a)-(2c), we have the equilibrium 
outputs of the leader and the followers respectively: 
   
 
5 6 2 2
,
4 3 4
A BPD
L
n n
q
n
   


                       (4a) 
   
 
5 6 2 2
,
4 3 4
B APD
L
n n
y
n
   


                       (4b) 
 
.
4 1
PD A
iq
n



                         (4c) 
To determine the total amount of the input, ,X sold to all the downstream buyers, we note that 
PD PD PD PD
L L iX q y nq    under the assumption that one unit of output requires one unit of input 
in production.  Substituting PD
Lq , 
PD
Ly , and 
PD
iq  from (4a)-(4c) into this expression yields  
 
(2 1) ( 1)
.
4 1
PD A Bn nX
n
   


                              (4d) 
                                                 
2 This finding contrasts with the result of Arya and Mittendorf (2010). The authors show that under Cournot 
competition, input prices reflect only the averaging of demand conditions of the two downstream markets. 
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 Making use of (4a)-(4d), we have the comparative statics of downstream entry: 
 
2
( )0
2 3 4
PD
L A Bq
n n
  
  
 
 when ( ) ,A B              (5a) 
 
2
( )0
2 3 4
PD
L B Ay
n n
  
  
 
 when ( ) ,A B              (5b) 
 
2
0,
4 1
PD
i A
q
n n

  
 
              (5c) 
 
2
0.
4 1
PD
AX
n n

 
 
              (5d) 
Equations (5a) and (5b) indicate the differences in demands between the two downstream 
markets when entry affects the equilibrium outputs of the leader.  If demand in the oligopolistic 
market exceeds that in the monopoly market, entry increases the leader’s output in the 
oligopolistic market but decreases its output in the monopoly market.  This suggests that entry 
generates a “business-creating effect” in the oligopolistic market but a “business-stealing effect” 
in the monopoly market.  If, instead, demand in the oligopolistic market is lower than demand in 
the monopoly market, entry generates a business-stealing effect in former market and a business-
creating effect in the latter market. These two conflicting effects thus depend on the market 
demand differential.  Nevertheless, for any differences of demand conditions between the two 
downstream markets, entry generates both effects to the leader from each market equally so that 
the equilibrium outputs of the leader are independent of entry.   
For each follower, we have from (5c) that entry generates a business-stealing effect.  For 
the upstream supplier, we have from (5d) that entry generates a business-creating effect.   
The net equilibrium profits for the input supplier, the downstream leader and its 
competition are given, respectively, as 
9 
     
  
2 2 2 2 24 7 2 3 2 4 8 4
,
8 3 4 1
A B A BPD
S
n n n n n n
n n
   

       

 
           (6) 
 
     
   
2 3 2 2 3 2 3 2
2
4 37 72 40 25 89 104 40 20 84 112 48
,
16 3 4 1
A B A BPD
L
n n n n n n n n n
k
n n
   

          
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       (7)                              
 
2
2
.
16 1
PD A
i k
n

  

                 (8) 
Next, we analyze how downstream entry affects social welfare by comparing the 
equilibrium number of followers under market conditions, denoted by *,n  and the one 
determined by the social planner, denoted by ˆ.n  If 
*n   equals  ˆ,n  entry is socially optimal; if 
*n   
is greater than  ˆ,n  entry is socially excessive; but if *n   is less than  ˆ,n  entry is socially 
insufficient. We firstly determine the equilibrium number of followers under market conditions.  
Using the zero-profit condition, 
 
2
2
0,
16 1
PD A
i k
n

   

                                                                                                            (9a) 
we solve for the number of the followers in the free-entry equilibrium as   
 *
1
1.
4
An
k
                                                                                                                           (9b) 
    Next, we determine the socially optimal number of the followers from the social 
planner’s perspective.  The objective is to maximize overall welfare, which is taken to be the 
sum of the upstream input supplier’s profits, the profits of the leader the followers in the 
downstream markets, and consumer surplus in both markets.  That is, the social planner solves 
the following welfare maximization problem: 
10 
ˆ{ }
  = ,PD PD PD PD PD PDs L i A B
n
Max SW n CS CS                                                                              
where ,  ,  and PD PD PDs L i   are given by (6), (7), and (8), respectively, 
2( ) 2,PD PD PDA L iCS q nq   
and 
2( ) 2.PD PDB LCS y   Taking the first-order derivative of 
PDSW  with respect to ,n setting the 
resulting expression to zero, we have  
2 4 3 2 2 4 3 2 4 3 2
2 3
(40 239 522 498 176) (10 46 78 58 16) (4 12 12 4 )
0.
16(3 7 4)
A B A Bn n n n n n n n n n n n k
n n
               
 
 
                                                                                                                                                     (10) 
This FOC defines the socially optimal number of the entrants (denoted as ˆ)n  in the downstream 
oligopolistic market. 
 Evaluating the left hand side of (10) at the point where 
*n n  as given in (9b), we show 
in Appendix A-1 that   
1
1
4
0.
PD
n A
k
SW
n  



 
The strict concavity of the social welfare function implies that the equilibrium number of the 
followers under market conditions is less than the socially optimal number of the followers.  That 
is, 
* ˆ.n n   We thus have  
PROPOSITION 1. Under input price discrimination with the presence of scale economies and 
a multiproduct leader in a downstream oligopolistic market, entry into the downstream market is 
socially insufficient. 
    The intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows. Under input price discrimination, 
downstream entry generates the business-creating effect to benefit the upstream input supplier.  
This result emerges, regardless of differences in demands between the downstream markets.  For 
the leader serving both of the downstream markets, if demand in the oligopolistic market exceeds 
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demand in the monopoly market, entry generates a business-creating effect in the oligopolistic 
market and a business-stealing effect in the monopoly market.  If, instead, demand in the 
monopoly market exceeds demand in the oligopolistic market, entry generates a business-
creating effect in the monopoly market but a business-stealing effect in the oligopolistic market.  
Hence, from the leader's perspective, entry has a business-creating effect in the market with a 
higher demand and a business-stealing effect in the market with a lower demand.  Nevertheless, 
for the leader the business-creating effect and the business-stealing effect cancel out each other, 
for any differences in demands.  Consequently, entry does not have any business effect for the 
leader.  For the followers, however, entry always results in a business-stealing effect regardless 
of differences in market demands between the two output markets. 
The strength of both business effects is shown to depend on the differences in demand 
conditions of the two downstream markets. This implies that both business effects directly affect 
overall welfare. We thus can infer that under discriminatory input pricing with scale economies 
and market leader, the business-creating effect always dominates the business-stealing effect, 
with the consequence that entry is socially insufficient. 
 
1.2.2 Downstream Entry under Uniform Input Pricing 
Under this regime, the upstream supplier charges an identical price for its input to all 
downstream firms.  Given input price w, the follower ith for i = 1, 2… n chooses its output 
i
q  to 
maximize its own profit
i
 , taking the outputs of rival firms as given. Formally, the ith 
follower’s profit maximization problem is:      
 
 
1
 
n
A Li ii
iqi
Max q w kqq 

 
      
                                                                                          
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Using the FOC for the ith follower, we solve for its output as a function of the leader’s output: 
1
A L
i
w q
q
n
  


                (11) 
The multiproduct leader determines its output decisions by choosing 
L
q  and 
L
y  that solve 
for the following joint profit maximization problem: 
 
 
{ , }
 
1
A
L A B
q y
L
L L L L
L L
n q w
Max q w q y w y k
n

  
  
        
  
          
The FOCs with respect to 
L
q  and 
L
y  yield the equilibrium outputs of the leader as  
,
2
A
L
w
q
 
              (12a)  
.
2
B
L
w
y
 

             
(12b) 
Using (11) and (12a), we calculate the output of each follower to be 
 2 1
A
i
w
q
n
 


              (12c) 
The upstream input monopolist determines an optimal price solving the following profit 
maximization problem: 
 
 s L L i
w
Max q y nq w                        (13) 
Substituting (12a)-(12c) into s  in (13), we set the derivative sd dw  to zero and solve for the 
optimal input price as  
   2 1 1
.
2(3 2)
A BUP
n n
w
n
   


                                                                                                    (14)      
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where the subscript “UP” represents the case of uniform pricing.  The result in (14) indicates that 
the equilibrium input price reflects a two-fold averaging across both downstream markets and 
firms. 
Substituting 
UPw  from (14) back into (12a)-(12c), we obtain the equilibrium outputs of 
the leader and each follower as follows: 
   
 
4 3 1
,
4 3 2
A BUP
L
n n
q
n
   


                                                          (15a) 
   
 
5 3 2 1
,
4 3 2
B AUP
L
n n
y
n
   


           (15b) 
   
  
4 3 1
.
4 3 2 1
A BUP
i
n n
q
n n
   

 
           (15c) 
To determine the total amount of the input X sold by the upstream supplier to all downstream 
buyers, we note that UP UP UP UP
L L iX q y nq   .  Substituting
UP
Lq , 
UP
Ly , and 
UP
iq  from (15a)-(15c) 
into this expression yields   
   
 
2 1 1
.
4 1
A BUP
n n
X
n
   


           (15d) 
 From (15a)-(15d), we have the comparative statics of downstream entry: 
 
2
( )0
4 3 2
UP
L B Aq
n n
  
  
 
 when ( ) ,A B               (16a) 
 
2
( )0
4 3 2
UP
L B Ay
n n
  
  
 
 when ( ) ,A B                                                (16b) 
   
   
2 2
2 2
3 6 3 12 18 7
( )0
4 3 2 1
UP
B Ai
n n n nq
n n n
     
  
  
 when ( ) ,A B               (16c) 
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 
2
0.
4 1
UP
AX
n n

 
 
               (16d) 
Equations (16a) and (16b) indicate that differences in demands between the downstream markets 
play an important role in determining how entry affects the equilibrium outputs of the market 
leader.  When the two markets are identical in demands, entry exerts no effects on the leader’s 
output decisions.  However, when differences of the demand conditions between oligopolistic 
market and monopolistic market are small, entry reduces the outputs of the leader in both 
markets slightly.  In addition, if this difference is significantly large, entry lowers the outputs of 
the leader in both markets extremely.  On the other hand when the difference of the demand 
conditions between monopoly market and oligopolistic market is small, entry will increase the 
outputs of the leader for both markets slightly and when this difference is significantly large, 
entry will extremely raise the outputs of the leader in both markets.  For each follower, we have 
from equation (16c) that entry will increase the output only when the demand condition of 
monopoly market is significantly larger than oligopolistic market and entry will decrease the 
output for vice versa. 
Because the uniform pricing reflects a two-fold averaging both across markets and across 
firms, entry affects the input price and the strength of which depends on the difference in 
demand conditions between the downstream markets. If the difference is significantly large, the 
strength of this effect will be extremely strong. For the upstream supplier, we have from equation 
(16d) that entry will always increase the total amount of the input to be sold in both of the 
downstream markets.  Consequently, there is a business-creating effect resulting from entry. In 
conclusion, under uniform pricing, if the demand condition of oligopolistic market is larger than 
monopolistic market then all firms in the downstream market will incur the business-stealing 
effect except the upstream supplier that will have the business-creating effect.  But if the demand 
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condition of the monopolistic market is larger than that of the oligopolistic market, all firms in 
the downstream market and upstream supplier will incur the business-creating effect. 
The net equilibrium profits of the supplier, the leader, and the ith follower for i = 1, 2… n 
are given, respectively, as 
   
  
2[ 2 1 1 ]
,
8 1 3 2
A BUP
S
n n
n n
 

  

 
             (17) 
2 3 2 2 3 2 3 2
2
(4 24 29 10) (25 56 41 10) (20 50 42 12)
,
16( 1)(3 2)
UP A B A B
L
n n n n n n n n n
k
n n
   

          
 
 
                               (18) 
   
   
2
2 2
[ 4 3 1 ]
.
16 1 3 2
A BUP
i
n n
k
n n
 

  
 
 
             (19) 
   Next we show how entry affects social efficiency by comparing the equilibrium number 
of followers under market conditions, denoted by **,n  and the one determined by the social 
planner, denoted by .n   To solve for the equilibrium number of followers under market 
conditions, we use the following zero-profit condition:  
   
   
2
2 2
[ 4 3 1 ]
0,
16 1 3 2
A BUP
i
n n
k
n n
 

  
  
 
                                                                            (20a) 
and find that 
2 2
**
4 20 16 8 16 8 16
.
24
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n
k
              

     
(20b) 
    For determining the socially optimal number of the followers, we assume that the 
objective of the social planner is to maximize overall welfare, which is the sum of firm profits 
and consumer surplus in the vertically related markets.  That is, the social planner solves the 
following welfare maximization problem:  
16 
{ }
 SW  = ,UP UP UP UP UP UPS L i A B
n
Max n CS CS                                                                               
where ,  ,  and UP UP UPS L i   are given by (17), (18), and (19), respectively, 
2( ) 2,UP UP UPA L iCS q nq   and 
2( ) 2.UP UPB LCS y   Taking the first-order derivative of 
UPSW  
with respect to ,n setting the resulting expression to zero, we have  
2 4 3 2 2 4 3 2 4 3 2(38 149 201 115 24) (5 19 27 17 4) (11 21 6 8 4)
0.
16( 1)(3 2)
A B A Bn n n n n n n n n n n n k
n n
                
 
 
                       (21) 
This FOC defines the socially optimal number of the entrants (denoted as )n  in the downstream 
oligopolistic market.  
    Evaluating the left hand side of (21) at the point **n n  as derived in (20b), we show in 
Appendix A-2 that 
**
0.
UP
n n
SW
n 



 
This implies that the equilibrium number of the followers under market conditions is less than 
the social optimal number of the followers. That is, 
** .n n   As a result, entry under this regime 
is socially insufficient. 
PROPOSITION 2: Under uniform input pricing with the presence of scale economies and a 
multiproduct leader in a downstream oligopolistic market, entry into the downstream market is 
socially insufficient. 
      The intuition for the proposition 2 is as follows. Under uniform input pricing, entry can 
create the business-creating effect to the supplier for any differences of the demand conditions 
between the two downstream markets. For the leader, when the demand condition in downstream 
monopoly market is larger than downstream oligopolistic market, entry will create the business-
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creating effect for both downstream markets. However, entry will create business-stealing effect 
for both downstream markets when the demand condition in downstream oligopolistic market is 
larger than downstream monopoly market. The strength of both effects will depend on the 
difference of the demand conditions between the two downstream markets so the larger of the 
difference of the demand conditions, the stronger of the business effects.  
       For the follower, entry generates a business creating effect only when the difference of 
the demand conditions between the downstream monopoly market and downstream oligopolistic 
market is significantly large.  Otherwise, entry generates a business-stealing effect instead. As a 
result, when there is a significantly difference of the demand conditions between the two 
downstream markets, entry generates a significant effect on social welfare.  However, when there 
is a significant difference of the demand conditions between the two downstream markets, the 
business-creating effect always dominates the business-stealing effect and entry is always 
socially insufficient. 
 
1.3 Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we focus our analysis on a vertically related market structure to examine the 
social efficiency of downstream entry under different input pricing regimes provided by the 
upstream supplier. Competition in the downstream oligopolistic market is characterized by a 
Stackelberg leader-follower game with the leader being a multiproduct firm operating as a 
monopolist in its own product market.  We show that in the presence of scale economies the 
alternative input price regimes (discriminatory vs. uniform) did not determine the effect of 
downstream entry to the oligopolistic market on social welfare; entry is always socially 
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insufficient for both pricing regimes.  As a result, entry regulation may not be justified in a 
downstream oligopoly of a vertical market structure. 
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Chapter 2 - Input Price Discrimination vs. Uniform Pricing in 
Vertically Related Markets with Downstream Entry 
2.1 Introduction 
 The primary objective of this paper is to analyze how alternative input price regimes 
(discriminatory vs. uniform) and downstream entry affect social efficiency in vertically related 
markets.  The vertical structure is composed of a foreign upstream supplier selling an essential 
input to domestic downstream purchasers operating in two different markets, one is oligopolistic 
and the other is monopolistic.  In the oligopolistic market, an incumbent firm and entrants 
engage in Cournot competition.  In the monopoly market, the incumbent firm sells a different 
product in its own market.  The upstream supplier has the options of choosing between a 
discriminatory input pricing and a uniform input pricing.  One of these phenomena can be 
frequently observed in developing countries when they have to import an essential input such as 
crude oil to produce final products in domestic markets. We consider the case that demand in the 
oligopolistic market is greater or identical to demand in the monopoly market.  For analytical 
simplicity, we assume that the marginal cost of the upstream supplier is zero and that all firms in 
the oligopolistic market have an identical set-up cost.  
The upstream input supplier has the options of offering either uniform or discriminatory 
input pricing to each firm producing downstream.3  The consideration of an alternative input 
pricing regime is consistent with that Arya and Mittendorf (2010). Under input price 
                                                 
3 This input price discrimination which is one of the most common forms of price discrimination, third-degree price 
discrimination, means that different buyers are charged with different prices but each buyer pays a constant amount 
for each unit of the input they bought. This is different from first degree price discrimination and second degree 
price discrimination. For first degree price discrimination, the seller will charge a different price for each unit of 
input when the price charged for each unit of inputs is equal to the maximum willingness to pay for that unit. For the 
second degree price discrimination, the seller will charge different prices to each buyer and these different prices 
will depend on the number of unit of input bought, but not across customer. 
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discrimination, each firm is offered different input prices and the offering reflects an averaging 
of the demand conditions in which each firm operates. 
Under uniform input pricing, each downstream firm is offered an identical input price and 
such offering reflects a two-fold averaging, across both markets and across all firms. Arya and 
Mittendorf (2010) also show that price concession will accrue to the weaker input buyers whose 
output markets have lower demand.  Thus, under uniform input pricing and the oligopolistic 
market has a higher demand than the monopoly market, the input price for the multiproduct firm 
will be increased.  As a result, the multiproduct firm has a higher incentive to produce more 
under input price discrimination than under uniform input pricing. The increased motivation for 
production of multiproduct firm under input price discrimination is welfare-enhancing.   In our 
study, in which there are entrants into downstream oligopolistic market, the number of entrants 
exerts a significant effect on the optimal input price under the uniform pricing regime but not on 
the optimal input price under a discriminatory regime. The effect of downstream entry on input 
price under uniform input pricing is shown to depend on the demand conditions between the 
downstream markets.  If the demand condition of the oligopolistic market is higher than that of 
the monopoly market, downstream entry increases the optimal input price charged by the input 
supplier. If the demand conditions of the two output markets are identical, downstream entry has 
no effect on input price. The increase in input price resulting from the entry is shown to be a key 
factor that creates either the business-stealing effect4 or the business-creating effect5 to each 
downstream firm.  
                                                 
4 The business-stealing effect exists when the equilibrium strategic response of existing firms to new entry results in 
their having a lower volume of sales. 
5 The business-creating effect exists when the equilibrium strategic response of existing firms to new entry results in 
their having a higher volume of sales. 
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Under input price discrimination, however, downstream entry generates an impact to the 
downstream oligopoly market through (i) a business-creating effect to the upstream supplier and 
(ii) a business-stealing effect to the incumbent firm and entrants.  A great deal of contributions 
has studied how entry affects social welfare. In their seminal work, Mankiv and Whinston (1986) 
show that under oligopolistic homogenous market with no integer constraint and the presence of 
scale economies, entry is socially excessive so that entry restrictions are often socially desirable. 
Ghosh and Morita (2007) demonstrate that under a successive vertical oligopoly model 
incorporating vertical relationship between industries, the free entry equilibrium can be socially 
insufficient rather than excessive. Mukerjee (2012) shows that in the presence of scale 
economies, if the marginal cost difference between the leader and the follower is significantly 
large, entry is always socially insufficient and in the absence of scale economies, entry is always 
socially insufficient.  Herweg and Muller (2012) show that entry can be either socially 
insufficient or excessive by permitting price discrimination in input markets and taking the 
downstream industry as exogenously given. 
Next we will present some articles mentioning about the comparative advantage and 
disadvantage of uniform pricing and price discrimination onto social welfare. Subsequently, 
Bork’s (1978) defenses about price discrimination and concludes that the uniform pricing can 
offer significant welfare benefits. Whereas the authors who support the notion that price 
discrimination can provide welfare benefits by siphoning the production to the less efficient 
sources compose of Katz (1987), Yoshida (2000), Arya and Mittendorf (2010) and Chen, Hwang 
and Peng ( 2011). 
Katz (1987) demonstrates that intermediate good price discrimination may shift prices in 
a way that reduces output in the final good market and thus lower consumer’s surplus and 
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welfare. However, this pricing regime may increase welfare by preventing socially inefficient 
integration. Yoshida (2000) shows that in a special case, when all downstream firms can be 
ordered in efficiency, price discrimination always reduces both the total output of the final good 
and welfare level. Nevertheless, in a general case, input-market price discrimination can lower or 
raise the total output of the final good and welfare level. Arya and Mittendorf (2010) 
demonstrate that price discrimination can provide welfare gains by giving price concessions to 
less efficient firms. They show that when the markets have lower demand and lower competition, 
price discrimination will stifle the social efficiency by shifting output to less competitive 
markets. Chen, Hwang and Peng (2011) show that input price discrimination can create positive 
effect to social welfare under the condition that the positive output allocation efficiency effect 
outweighs the negative production efficiency effect. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the model. 
Section 2.3 presents the results. Section 2.4 concludes. 
 
2.2 The Analytical Framework  
We consider a simple vertical structure in which there is a foreign upstream monopoly 
supplier selling an essential input to domestic buyers in two downstream markets: one is an 
oligopoly and the other is a monopoly.  In the downstream oligopolistic market, there is Cournot 
competition between the incumbent firm and entrants. The incumbent firm in the oligopolistic 
market also operates as a monopolist in its own product market. For analytical simplicity, we 
impose the following assumptions: (i) the production cost of the upstream monopoly supplier 
equals to zero, (ii) all downstream firms require one unit of input to produce one unit of final 
output, (iii) demand in the oligopolistic market is greater or equal to demand in the monopoly 
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market, (iv) the incumbent firm and entrants in the downstream oligopolistic market incur a set 
up cost k and all entrants in this market are similar. 
Let the (inverse) demand in the downstream oligopolistic market be given as 
1
n
A A A i
i
P q q

   , where 
A
P  is market price, Aq  and iq  are the quantities of the output produced 
by the incumbent firm and the ith entrant (for i = 1, 2… n) respectively, and 
A
  represents 
demand condition of the market. The (inverse) demand in the downstream monopoly market is 
assumed to be
B B A
P y  , where 
B
P  and Ay  are price and quantity of the incumbent firm, B  
represents demand condition of the monopoly market. 
The foreign upstream monopoly supplier can provide two regulatory input pricing 
regimes between input price discrimination and uniform input pricing. Under input price 
discrimination, the supplier can provide different input prices to each downstream firm; in this 
case, the incumbent firm and entrants pay wA and wi respectively. Under uniform input pricing, 
the supplier will provide the same input price to all buyers; in this case, each firm pays w for 
each unit of input. In the following analysis, we employ backward induction to identify the 
subgame perfect Nash equilibria. 
 
2.2.1 Input Price Discrimination 
Under this input pricing regime, the supplier charges separated prices for inputs to the 
incumbent firm and entrants. Given input price 
i
w  , the ith entrant for i = 1, 2… n chooses its 
output 
i
q  to maximize its total profit and takes its rival output 
A
q  as given. Formally, firm ith 
problem is: 
 
 
1
 .
n
ii A A i i
iqi
Max kq q qw

                                                                         
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Similarly, given input price
A
w , the incumbent firm chooses its outputs 
A
q and
A
y to maximize its 
total profit and takes its rival output 
i
q as given. Formally, the incumbent firm problem is: 
   
{ , } 1
.
n
AA A B A A AA i A
iq yA A
Max y w y kq q qw 

                     
Solving for the outputs of the ith entrant and the incumbent firm, we have  
2
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A i A
i
w w
q
n
  


 for 1,..., ,i n              (1a) 
 1
,
2
A A i
A
w n nw
q
n
   

               
(1b) 
.
2
B A
A
w
y
 

                
(1c) 
We find that for the downstream oligopolistic market, an increase in 
A
w   and iw  
will 
raise the outputs of the entrant and incumbent firm respectively. 
The supplier maximizes the following expression to determine input prices 
 
 s
,
 ,
A i
A A A i i
w w
Max w q y nw q                                                                                       
where ,
i
q ,Aq and Ay  are given in (1a), (1b), and (1c), respectively.  Solving for the input prices 
yields             
,
4
PD A B
Aw
 
                (2a) 
3
.
8
PD A B
iw
 

               
(2b) 
Based on the discriminatory input prices in (2a) and (2b), we see that the input prices reflect an 
averaging of demand conditions in the downstream markets and that entry into the oligopolistic 
markets have no effects on input prices.  
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PROPOSITION 1 Under input price discrimination, the optimal input prices reflect an 
averaging of demand conditions that each firm operates and downstream entry exerts no effect at 
all on these input prices. 
The intuition for Proposition 1 is as follows. Under input price discrimination, the input 
prices reflect an averaging of demand conditions that each firm operates which is consistent with 
the results of Arya and Mittendorf (2010).  Because the incumbent firm operates in two separate 
markets and demand condition in one of which is lower, the firm obtains a price discount on 
input price from the upstream input supplier. The incumbent has a stronger incentive to increase 
its production under input pricing discrimination than uniform input pricing.  The input price 
discount is one of the factors that affect overall welfare as a motivation for the incumbent firm to 
shift the production to lower demand market. 
Substituting (2a)-(2b) back into (1a)-(1c), we calculate the equilibrium levels of outputs 
for the incumbent firm, the ith entrant (for i = 1, 2… n), and the total input: 
   
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(3d) 
 
Making use of (3a)-(3d), we have the comparative statics of downstream entry: 
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            Equations (3e)-(3h) indicate that entry lowers the output levels of the incumbent firm and 
entrants but increases the total input in the downstream markets.  Hence, entry generates a 
business-stealing effect to the incumbent firm and entrants, but a business-creating effect to the 
upstream supplier.  However, entry does not affect the outputs of the incumbent firm in the 
downstream monopoly market. 
The net equilibrium profits for the supplier, the incumbent firm, and the ith entrant for i = 
1, 2… n, are respectively: 
     
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          Next we examine the effect of downstream entry on social welfare. Using equation (4c), 
we have the following expressions for the zero-profit condition and the equilibrium number of 
followers under the market solution: 
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To evaluate whether n
 
in the downstream oligopolistic market is socially excessive or 
insufficient, we assume that there is a social planner with an objective of maximizing overall 
welfare by an optimal number of followers.  Given that the upstream input supplier is a foreigner 
firm, its profit does not constitute a component of domestic welfare.  The welfare maximizing 
number of the followers can be obtained by solving the following problem: 
 
PD SW  = PD PD A BA i
n
Max n CS CS       
which is                                                                                                                                      
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The first-order condition for welfare optimization is: 
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Evaluating the first-order derivative PDSW n   at the point the value of n satisfies the zero-
profit condition in (5b), we have  
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(7) 
The strict concavity of the social welfare function implies that entry is socially excessive.  We 
thus have  
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PROPOSITION 2 Under input price discrimination, if the upstream input supplier is a foreign 
firm but the multiproduct firm and entrants are domestic firms, entry is always socially excessive 
for the domestic country, with the scale economies. 
The intuition for Proposition 2 is as follows. When the upstream input supplier is a foreign firm, 
its profit will be excluded from the welfare function. As a result, the domestic country 
determines its socially optimal number of entry by maximizing the sum of consumer surplus 
from oligopolistic market and monopoly market and total net profits of multiproduct firm and 
entrants. Since more entry decrease the outputs and profits of multiproduct firm and entrants, 
both of these effects create excessive entry of entrants in domestic country. 
 
 2.2.2 Uniform Input Pricing 
Under this input pricing regime, the supplier provides the input price to all firms equally. 
Given its input price w, the ith entrant for i = 1, 2… n chooses its output 
i
q  to maximize its total 
profit
i
 , taking its rival output 
A
q  as given. Formally, firm ith’s problem is: 
 
 
1
 .
n
A Ai ii
iqi
Max q w kqq

 
       
                                                                       
    The incumbent firm determines the quantities of products
A
q  and 
A
y
 
to be sold in 
downstream oligopolistic market and the monopoly market by maximizing its overall profits 
,
A
  taking as given its rival output .
i
q   Formally, the incumbent firm’s profit maximization 
problem is: 
   { , } 1 .
n
A A A Bi A A Aq y iA A
Max q w q y w y kq 

                                                 
 Solving for the output levels of the ith entrant and the incumbent firm yields 
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    The foreign supplier maximizes its total profit by determining an optimal input price w  
solving for the following problem:  
 
 s ,A A i
w
Max q y nq w               
where the quantities of the input demanded by the downstream firms are given in equations  
(8a)-(8c). Solving for the optimal input price yields                                                                                                                                    
   2 1 2
6 8
.
A B
n nUP
n
w
   

                                                                                             (9) 
Based on UPw in (9) under uniform pricing, we see that the input price reflects a two-fold 
averaging both across markets and across firms.  We, therefore, have  
PROPOSITION 3 Under uniform input pricing in a vertical market with downstream entry, the 
optimal input price reflects a two-fold averaging both across markets and across firms. 
      The intuition for proposition 3 is as follows. Under uniform input pricing, the input price 
will reflect a two-fold averaging across markets and across firms. Under this input pricing 
regime, the upstream input supplier will provide the same input price to all firms and when the 
number of firms increases, the uniform input price will be increased. Nevertheless for the 
entrants, the uniform input price is still lower than discriminatory input price so the entrants 
prefer to produce under uniform input pricing than discriminatory input pricing. On the other 
hand for the incumbent firm, the uniform input price is higher than discriminatory input price so 
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the incumbent firm prefers to produce under discriminatory input pricing than uniform input 
pricing. 
      Substituting UPw from (9) back into (8a)-(8c), we obtain the equilibrium outputs of the 
incumbent firm, the ith entrant (for i = 1, 2… n), and the total input.  These results are recorded as 
follows:  
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Making use of (10a)-(10d), we have the comparative statics of downstream entry: 
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             Equations (10e)-(10h) indicate that under uniform input pricing, entry and demand 
conditions between the downstream oligopolistic market and the downstream monopoly market 
will have the significant effect to the outputs of the incumbent firm and the entrants. For the 
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incumbent firm, when the demand conditions of the two downstream markets are equal, there is 
no effect from the entry to the output in the downstream monopoly market but entry will 
decrease the output in the downstream oligopolistic market. Furthermore, when the demand 
condition of the downstream oligopolistic market is larger than the downstream monopoly 
market, entry will reduce the outputs for both markets. For the entrant, entry will decrease the 
output when the demand condition of downstream oligopolistic market is significantly larger or 
identical to the downstream monopoly market. 
Because the uniform input pricing reflects a two-fold averaging both across markets and 
across firms, when the supplier provides the uniform input price to the buyers, entry will have 
significant effect to the input price and the strength of this effect will depend on the difference of 
the demand conditions. If the demand condition of the downstream oligopolistic market is 
significantly larger than the downstream monopoly market entry will extremely increase the 
input price. For the supplier, entry will increase the total inputs that will be sold in both 
downstream markets for any differences of the demand conditions.  
    Next, we calculate the net equilibrium profits of the supplier, the incumbent firm, and the 
ith entrant (for i = 1, 2… n).  These results are recorded as follows:  
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and 
32 
   
   
2
2 2
2 2 3 2
4 3 4 2
.
A B
n n
UP
i
n n
k
 

    
 
                                                                               (11c) 
The equilibrium number of downstream entrants under market conditions is determined by the 
following zero-profit condition: 
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Solving for the optimal number of entrants yields                                                                
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  To evaluate whether n
 
in the downstream oligopolistic market is socially excessive or 
insufficient, we continue to assume that the social planner's objective to maximize overall 
welfare by solving the following problem: 
 
 SW  = .UP UP UP A BA i
n
Max n CS CS               
That is,     
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where 
4 3 276 520 1260 1296 480a n n n n     , 
4 3 279 512 1220 1264 480,b n n n n      
4 3 292 612 1480 1536 576.c n n n n      
The first-order derivative of  SWUP  is: 
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where   
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Evaluating the first-order derivative UPSW n   in (13) at the point where the value of n 
satisfies the zero-profit condition in (12b), we have  
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where  
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The strict concavity of the social welfare function implies that entry is socially excessive.  We, 
therefore, have   
PROPOSITION 4 Under uniform input pricing, if the upstream input supplier is a foreign firm 
but the multiproduct firm and entrants are domestic firms, entry is always socially excessive for 
the domestic country, with the scale economies. 
The intuition for Proposition 4 is as follows. Under uniform input pricing and the 
upstream input supplier is a foreign firm, entry is always socially excessive. Because entry will 
reduce both output and profit of the multiproduct firm and entrants, both of these effects create 
excessive entry of entrants in domestic country. 
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2.3 Concluding Remarks 
We have analyzed and compared the effects of alternative input price regimes on overall 
welfare in vertically related markets with downstream entry.  The vertical structure is composed 
of a foreign upstream monopoly supplier selling an essential input to domestic downstream 
purchasers operating in two different markets, an oligopoly and a monopoly.  In the oligopolistic 
market, a multiproduct firm (being the incumbent) competes with entrants in a Cournot fashion.  
In the monopoly market, the incumbent sells a different product in its own market.  The upstream 
supplier has the options of choosing between a discriminatory input pricing and a uniform input 
pricing.  We assume that market demand  under oligopoly is greater or identical to that under 
monopoly, the marginal cost of the upstream supplier is zero and all firms in the oligopolistic 
market have an identical set-up cost.   
             When the upstream input supplier is a foreign firm and the multiproduct firm and 
entrants are domestic firms, the upstream input supplier’s profit will be excluded from the 
welfare function. To determine the social optimal number of entrants, the domestic country will 
maximize the sum of consumer surplus from oligopolistic market and monopoly market and the 
total net profits of multiproduct firm and entrants. Because more entrants decrease both the 
output and profit of the multiproduct firm and entrants, these effects create excessive entry in the 
domestic country whether the input price will be determined by discriminate input pricing or 
uniform input pricing.  
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Chapter 3 - Welfare Implications of Downstream Entry When 
Vertically Integrated Firm Adopts a Non-Foreclosure Strategy 
3.1 Introduction 
The objective of this paper is to examine how entry into the downstream retail market 
affects social welfare when a vertically integrated producer (VIP) controls the supply of an 
essential input to all rival firms producing downstream.  Strategically, a VIP can foreclose 
downstream buyers by setting a sufficiently high input price and making its rivals unprofitable.  
Nevertheless, a foreclosure strategy eliminates the VIP’s sales of its input to downstream buyers 
and takes out the VIP’s profit from the wholesale procedure.  This is especially true when the 
wholesale profit is significantly large and the VIP finds its foreclosure strategy to be 
unprofitable.  We wish to examine the role that the non-foreclosure condition plays in 
determining the welfare effects of downstream entry, an issue that appears not to have been 
systematically examined in the industrial economics literature.       
It should be noted at the outset that the presence (or absence) of the non-foreclosure 
condition may affect market equilibrium outcomes under imperfect competition.  In an 
interesting study, Arya, Mittendorf and Sappington (2006) indicate that the foreclosure condition 
may dramatically reverse the standard conclusions for duopoly.  Specifically, the authors find 
that equilibrium price and industry profit are higher whereas consumer surplus and overall 
welfare are lower under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition. Considering the 
case in which the non-foreclosure condition holds, Chipty (2001) finds that vertical integration is 
harmless and consumers are better off due to the associated efficiency gains.  Given that the non-
foreclosure condition exerts a profound impact on social welfare, it is important to know its 
effect on the social efficiency of downstream entry. 
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A great deal of studies have devoted to examining the important issues on social 
efficiency of entry under different conditions. Mankiv and Whinston (1986) show that in a 
homogenous product market with scale economies and no integer constraint, the business-
stealing effect of free entry leads to an excessive number of firms from the social welfare 
perspective.  Ghosh and Saha (2005) show that in the absence of scale economies and the cost 
asymmetry, free entry can be socially excessive.  Mukherjee (2011) shows excessive entry under 
the absence of scale economies, which is consistent with the finding of Ghosh and Saha (2005).  
But Mukherjee (2011) indicates that the exogenous cost symmetry is responsible for this result 
instead of cost asymmetry.  Broll and Mukherjee (2009) analyze the welfare effect of entry under 
the conditions without scale economies but with production cost differences between the firms. 
The authors find that entry can be socially insufficient if the input market is intensified.  But if 
entrants display inefficiency in production costs and the input market is not intensified, entry is 
socially excessive. The recent contribution by Mukherjee (2012) further demonstrates that under 
Stackelberg competition without scale economies, entry is always socially insufficient.  But for 
conditions under which there are scale economies and the difference in marginal costs of 
production between the leader and its followers is sufficiently large, entry continues to be 
socially insufficient. 
 From a different angle, we examine issues on the social efficiency of entry in a vertical 
market structure where a vertically integrated producer adopts a non-foreclosure strategy.  For 
analyzing the social efficiency of entry when the non-foreclosure condition holds, it is necessary 
to consider the situation where the marginal cost of the VIP is higher than that of the entrant 
firms in the downstream market.  For a homogeneous product case where there are scale 
economies and marginal cost difference between the VIP and its retail competitors in a close 
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economy, we show that downstream entry is socially insufficient.  We further analyze the case of 
an open economy in which the VIP is a foreign firm.  We find that downstream continues to be 
socially insufficient.  The use of a production subsidy to domestic retail firms in the downstream 
market is shown to encourage entry and increase domestic welfare. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows.  Section 3.2 first describes the 
model of a vertically integrated producer and its rival competitors in the downstream retail 
market.  We then focus our analysis on welfare implications of downstream entry when the VIP 
adopts a non-foreclose strategy.  Section 3.3 analyzes the case when the VIP is a foreign firm 
and policy options for affecting downstream entry.  Section 3.4 concludes. 
 
3.2 The Model 
We consider a simple market structure composed of a vertically integrated producer 
(VIP) and its downstream retail competitors.  The VIP is a monopoly in supplying an essential 
input for its own retail production, as well as for its competitors producing downstream.  For the 
easiness of illustration, we assume that one unit of retail output requires one unit of the essential 
input and that the VIP’s cost of producing the input is zero.  Denote ( 0)w   as the input price 
that the VIP charges to each buyer.  We further assume that the marginal costs of producing the 
retail output for the VIP and each competitor are 
VIP
c  and ,
i
c  respectively.  As we wish to study 
the effect of non-foreclosure on social efficiency of entry, we assume that VIP ic c , where ic  is 
zero for simplicity.  All firms in the downstream output market incur a set-up cost, denoted as 
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( 0).k    Also, we impose the assumption of symmetry that the VIP’s retail competitors are 
identical in all aspects. 
In our analysis, there is a homogeneous good produced by all firms in the downstream 
market.  Market demand for the product is taken to be linear:
1
,
n
VIP i
i
P q q

    where P  is 
market price, and VIPq and iq  are the quantities of the retail good produced by the VIP and the i
th 
firm, respectively, and   is a positive parameter.  It is easy to verify that consumer surplus is 
given as 
2
1
( ) 2.
n
VIP i
i
CS q q

   
The timing of the two-stage game is as follows.  At stage one, the VIP determines an 
optimal input price for its retail competitors in the downstream market.  At stage two, the VIP 
and the retail firms engage in Cournot competition by choosing the quantities of retail outputs 
simultaneously and independently.  As standard in game theory, we use backward induction to 
solve for the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium for the two-stage game.   
We begin with the second stage of the game to determine retail outputs produced by 
firms in the downstream market.  Given input price ,w  the VIP decides on retail output 
VIP
q  to 
maximize its total profit, assuming that all the retail rivals do not change their output decisions.  
The profit maximization problem of the VIP is: 
   { } 1 1 .
n n
VIP VIP VIP VIPi i
q i iVIP
Max w q c q kq q 
 
        
Similarly, given input price w  set by the VIP, each downstream entrant chooses its output 
i
q  to 
maximize individual profit, assuming that all other firms in the market do not change their output 
decisions.  The profit maximization problem of each entrant is: 
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Solving for the Cournot outputs of the ith entrant and the VIP, we have  
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The total quantity of the input demanded is calculated as  
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Substituting 
i
q  and 
VIP
q  from (1) into the (inverse) demand function yields the market price: 
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At the first stage of the two-stage game, the VIP firm decides on an optimal input price 
that maximizes its total profit.  This profit function is given as ( ) ,VIP i VIP VIPnwq P c q k      
where 
VIP
q , 
i
q , and P  are given in (1) and (3).  Solving for the optimal input price yields 
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Making use of (1)-(4), we calculate the equilibrium outputs of the VIP and the ith entrant (i = 1, 
…, n): 
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We further calculate the equilibrium amount of the input as    
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Following from (5) and (6), we have the comparative statics of downstream entry:   
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Equations in (7a) indicate that entry lowers the retail output sold by the VIP but raises the total 
amount of the input sold to the downstream rivals.  Equation (7b) indicates that entry reduces 
retail output of each entrant. 
 
The net equilibrium profits of the VIP firm and the ith entrant are, respectively, given as: 
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Next, we show how downstream entry affects social welfare by comparing the 
equilibrium number of entrants under market conditions, denoted as 
*n , to the one determined by 
the social planner, denoted as n .  If 
*n   equals  ,n  entry is socially optimal; if 
*n  exceeds ,n  
entry is excessive; but if 
*n   falls short of ,n  entry is insufficient.  We first determine the optimal 
number of entrants under market conditions.  It follows from (8b) that the zero-profit condition is  
 
2
*
2
4
4
0VIP
i
c
n
k 

                 (9a) 
which implies that               
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To determine the socially optimal number of entrants, we assume that the objective of the 
social planner is to maximize overall welfare.  This social welfare (SW) function is taken to be 
the sum of the VIP’s total profit, the profits of the entrants, and consumer surplus in the 
downstream market.   
The social planner solves the following welfare maximization problem: 
* * *
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Max n CS                                                                                              
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Evaluating the left-hand side of equation (10a) at the point where 
*n n  and subtracting from the 
resulting expression the zero-profit condition in (10a), we have  
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which is strictly positive.   
 The effect of the marginal cost difference on the value of z  is shown by the derivative:  
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                               (10c)     
Equation (10b) indicates that the equilibrium number of entrants under market conditions is less 
than the optimal number of the entrants from the social welfare perspective.  That is, 
* ˆ.n n   
This is due to the strict concavity of the profit functions.  Equation (10c) indicates that the 
                                                 
6 Note that 
*
VIP
q  and *
i
q  are given in (5). 
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marginal cost difference between the VIP and its retail rivals has a role in affecting the 
insufficient entry.   
 We thus have  
PROPOSITION 1. In the case of a vertically integrated producer without foreclosure but with 
scale economies and marginal cost differentials between the VIP and its retail competitors, entry 
into the downstream market is socially insufficient. 
The intuition for the proposition 1 is as follows. When the non-foreclosure condition 
holds, entry results in both the business-creating effect and the business-stealing effect.  For the 
VIP firm, if the number of entrant firms increases, it reduces the outputs of the VIP firm but 
increases the total input sold in the downstream market. As a consequence, when the number of 
entrant firms increases, the total profits of the VIP firm will increase. For the retail competitors, 
if the number of entrants increases, the outputs and profits of the entrant firms will be decreased. 
Hence, for the entrant firm entry will create the business-stealing effect.  As the marginal cost 
difference between the VIP firm and the entrant firms increases, the strength of the business-
creating effect increases. 
Proposition 1 indicates that entry is socially insufficient in the presence of scale 
economies and the marginal cost difference between the VIP and its retail competitors.  This is 
because the business-stealing effect is dominated by the business-creating effect.  And the 
strength of the business-creating effect will depend on the marginal cost different between the 
VIP firm and the entrant firms. If the marginal cost difference between the VIP firm and entrant 
firm increases, the strength of the business-creating effect increases, thus resulting in insufficient 
entry. 
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3.3 Downstream Entry When the VIP is a Foreign Firm 
In this section, we examine welfare implications of downstream entry for an open 
economy where the VIP is a foreign business entity while its retail competitors are domestic 
firms.  That is, all the entrant firms into the downstream market are from the domestic country.  
Despite this, equilibrium outputs of the foreign VIP and the domestic retail firms, as well as the 
optimal number of entrants under market conditions, all remain unchanged.   
But the socially optimal number of the domestic retail firms differs due to changes in the 
social welfare function.  The total profit of the foreign VIP is excluded from the domestic 
welfare, which is the sum of the profits of domestic retail firms and consumer surplus.  The 
welfare maximization problem of the social planner in the open economy case with the VIP as 
the foreign business entity is: 
OP * *
ˆ{ }
 SW  = ,i
n
Max n CS            
where 
*
i  is given by (8b) and 
* * * 2( ) 2.
VIP i
CS q nq     
The following expression determines the socially optimal number of entrants ˆ( )n : 
   
 
3
ˆ ˆ2 4 4
ˆ 4
0.
VIP VIP
c n c n
n
k
    

                                                                                  (11a) 
Evaluating the left-hand side of equation (11a) at the point where 
*n n  and subtracting from the 
resulting expression the zero-profit condition in (9a), we have  
   
   
* *
2
3 2
* *
2 4 4 4
4 4
,
VIP VIP
VIP
c n c n c
n n
y
    
 
                                                                   (11b) 
which is strictly positive.  The effect of the marginal cost difference on the value of y  is shown 
by the derivative:  
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   
 
* *
3
*
2 4 2 3 4
4
0.
VIP
VIP
n c ny
c n
     
 
                                                                                      (11c)    
Equation (11b) indicates that the equilibrium number of entrants under market conditions is less 
than the socially optimal number of the entrants in the open economy with the VIP as the foreign 
firm.  That is, 
* ˆ.n n   Equation (11c) indicates that the marginal cost difference between the VIP 
and its retail competitors also plays a role in affecting the insufficient entry.   
 The results of the analyses allow us to establish the following proposition:      
PROPOSITION 2. For the case of a vertically integrated producer without foreclosure but with 
scale economies and marginal cost differences between the VIP and its retail competitors, if the 
VIP is a foreign firm in an open economy, downstream entry continues to be socially insufficient. 
The intuition for the proposition 2 is as follows. Because the VIP firm’s profit are not 
included in domestic welfare and entrant firms increase the inputs of the VIP firm and also 
increase the  total outputs sold in the downstream market as a consequence the consumer surplus 
increases. Both of these effects create insufficient entry of entrant firms in domestic country 
because the business-creating effect dominates the business-stealing effect and the strength of the 
business-creating effect will be increased if the marginal cost difference of the VIP firm and 
entrant firms increases. 
As entry into the downstream market is socially insufficient in the vertical market 
structure we consider, it is instructive to see if there are measures that can use to increase the 
number of entrants in the downstream retail market. One policy option that the social planner 
may consider for encouraging downstream entry is production subsidy.  In the subsequent 
analysis, we focus on a three-stage game in which the social planner decides on subsidy for each 
unit of output (denoted as s) that maximizes social welfare at the first stage of the game.  In the 
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second stage of the game, the VIP determines an optimal input price that maximizes its total 
profit.  In the third and last stage of the game, the VIP and its retail competitors engage in 
Cournot output competition.  As in the previous analysis, we use backward induction to solve for 
the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium for the three-stage game.  
   Given the unit production subsidy s and the input price ,w  the VIP decides on retail 
output 
VIP
q  in order to maximize its total profit, assuming that all other firms do not change their 
output decisions.  The VIP’s profit maximization problem is:  
   
{ } 1 1
.
n n
VIP VIP VIP VIPi i
i iqVIP
Max w q c q kq q 
 
          
Similarly, given s and w , the ith entrant chooses its retail output 
i
q  to maximize its total profit, 
assuming that all other retail firms and the VIP do not change their output decisions.  
  The profit maximization problem of the ith entrant is: 
 
 
1
 .
n
i VIP i i
iqi
Max s w kq q q 

                                                                      
Cournot competition implies that the outputs of the ith entrant and the VIP are: 
2 2
2
VIP
i
s w c
q
n
   


  and 
( 1)
.
2
VIP
VIP
nw ns c n
q
n
    


                     (12)  
Substituting outputs in (12) into the (inverse) demand function yields the market price:  
.
2
VIP
c nw ns
P
n
   


                     (13) 
The VIP firm decides on an optimal input price that maximizes its total profit: 
( ) ,VIP i VIP VIPnwq P c q k      where ,iq ,VIPq and P  are given in (12)-(13).  Solving for the 
optimal input price yields  
 ** 4 4 .
2 8
VIP
n s nc
w
n
   


                                                                                              (14) 
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Substituting **w  in (14) back into (12), we have the equilibrium outputs of the ith entrant and the 
VIP:  
 ** 2
4
VIP
i
c s
q
n


              (15a) 
 and  
   
 
**
4 3 4 2
.
2 4
VIP
VIP
n c n ns
q
n
    


                       (15b) 
The problem of the social planner is to determine an optimal production subsidy for each 
unit of output that maximizes social welfare.  This social welfare function is given as 
,i iSW n CS nsq    where ( )i VIP i in s w kq q q       , 
2( ) 2,VIP iCS q nq   and w , iq  
and 
VIP
q  are given in (14)-(15).  Solving for the optimal production subsidy rate yields                             
   ** 4 3 4 .
6 16
VIP
n c n
s
n
   


  
 We thus have       
PROPOSITION 3: In the case of a vertically integrated producer without foreclosure but with 
scale economies and marginal cost differentials between the VIP and its retail rivals, where the 
VIP is a foreign firm competing with domestic entrants, one effective way to increase the number 
of entrants is through the imposition of a production subsidy by the domestic government. 
The intuition for the proposition 3 is as follows. By taking the derivative of social welfare 
with respect to subsidy the result is positive. This indicates that offering subsidies to entrant 
firms is welfare improving.  In addition, although the subsidy is positive, it is decreasing with the 
number of downstream entrant and marginal cost of the VIP firm, but increase with the size of 
downstream market.   
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3.4 Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we examine welfare implications of downstream entry when an upstream 
VIP adopts a non-foreclosure strategy.  When the VIP firm has sufficiently large wholesale 
profit, it will not foreclose the entrant firms in downstream market.  In the presence of scale 
economies and the marginal cost difference between the VIP firm and downstream entrants, we 
show that entry is always socially insufficient.  This suggests that entry regulation is not 
theoretically justified in the downstream market.   
In an open economy where the VIP is a foreign firm, downstream entry remains to be 
socially insufficient. The marginal cost difference between the VIP and the entrants plays a role 
in influencing the social efficiency of entry.  An increase in the marginal cost difference 
increases the strength of the business-creating effect, which makes it less likely for the 
foreclosure condition to hold.   As a consequence, entry is socially insufficient.  To encourage 
downstream entry, one policy option for the domestic country government is to provide 
production subsidies to downstream domestic firms.  It is shown that a production subsidy policy 
toward the domestic firms is welfare-enhancing.   
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Appendix A - Appendix of Chapter 1 
A-1. Proof of Proposition 1 
To prove Proposition 1, we make use of profits from (6), (7) and (8), as well as CSA and CSB, 
and SWPD from the following expressions:  
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          (A.1) 
where 
 
4 3 2124 552 895 620 152,a n n n n      
 
4 3 291 418 715 540 152,b n n n n       
 
4 3 244 208 364 280 80c n n n n     . 
 
Taking the first-order derivative of the social welfare function SWPD in (A.1) with respect to n 
yields 
 
2 2
316
PD
A B A Bd e fSW k
n g
    
 

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where 
 
4 3 240 239 522 498 176,d n n n n      
  
4 3 210 46 78 58 16e n n n n     , 
 
4 3 24 12 12 4 ,f n n n n     
  
23 7 4.g n n    
 
Substituting the value of  k  from the zero-profit condition  in (9a) yields 
 
   
2 2
3 3
16 3 4 1
PD
A B A Bh j mSW
n n n
    

  
  
 
where  
 
4 3 213 104 270 290 112,h n n n n      
  
4 3 210 46 78 58 16j n n n n     ,  
 
4 3 24 12 12 4 .m n n n n      
 
By substituting 
*n  from (9b), we find that the derivative  PDSW n   is unambiguously 
positive.  The strict concavity of the PDSW function implies that 
* ˆn n  which, in turn, implies 
that entry is always socially insufficient.  This result can be illustrated by Figure A.1. 
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A-2. Proof of Proposition 2 
To prove Proposition 2, we make use of profits from (17), (18) and (19), as well as CSA, CSB, and 
SWUP from the following expressions: 
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Figure A.1.  Entry is socially insufficient  
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4 3 2124 388 439 214 38p n n n n     , 
 
4 3 291 300 365 194 38,q n n n n      
  
4 3 244 154 194 104 20.r n n n n      
 
Taking the first-order derivative of the social welfare function SWUP in (A.2) with respect to n 
yields 
 
2 2
16
UP
A B A Bt u vSW k
n w
    
 
  
 
where  
 
4 3 238 149 201 115 24,t n n n n      
 
4 3 25 19 27 17 4u n n n n     , 
 
4 3 211 21 6 8 4,v n n n n      
 
23 5 2.w n n    
 
Substituting k from zero profit condition (20a) yields 
 
   
2 2
3
16 1 3 2
UP
B A A Bx y zSW
n n n
    

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where  
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2 3 412 8 2 2 8 ,x n n n n      
  
2 3 422 3 10 6 22 ,y n n n n       
 
2 3 48 50 110 103 35 .z n n n n      
 
By substituting 
**n  from (20b), we find that the derivative  UPSW n   is unambiguously 
greater than zero.  The strict concavity of the UPSW function implies that 
**n n  which, in turn, 
implies that entry is always socially insufficient.   
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Appendix B - Appendix of Chapter 2 
B-1. Proof of Equation 7 
Using profits from (4b) and (4c) and CSA and CSB from the following expression, 
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We calculate social welfare under input price discrimination as   
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Then taking derivative SWPD with respect to n yields, 
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Plug in k  from (5a) yields, 
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B-2. Proof of Equation 14 
Using profits from (11b) and (11c) and CSA and CSB from the following expression,  
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We calculate social welfare under uniform input pricing as   
UP UP UP A BSW n CS CSiA
     =
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where 
4 3 276 520 1260 1296 480a n n n n     , 
4 3 279 512 1220 1264 480,b n n n n      
4 3 292 612 1480 1536 576c n n n n     . 
 
Then taking derivative SWUP with respect to n yields, 
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where 
4 3 210 18 204 360 192d n n n n      , 
4 3 211 82 228 280 128e n n n n      
4 3 246 216 352 192 576f n n n n      . 
By plugging k from (12a) yields, 
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where 
4 3 2106 590 1228 1128 384g n n n n     , 
4 3 25 38 108 136 64,h n n n n      
4 3 247 282 616 576 192j n n n n     . 
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Appendix C - Appendix of Chapter 3 
C-1. Proof of Proposition 1 
 
Making use of firm profits in (8a) and (8b) and consumer surplus from the following expression:  
 
   
 
   
 
2
*
2
2
[4 ]4 3 4 2* * 2
42 4 8 4
1 1
( ) ,
2 2
VIP VIPVIP VIP
VIP
c n cn c n c
i nn n
CS q nq n
      
 
 
     
            
 
we calculate social welfare to be  
 
* * *
VIP iSW n CS   
 
       
22 2 2 2 2 2
2
(3 24 48 ) (11 72 48) (2 32 96)
( 1) .
8( 4)
VIP
VIP
n n c n n c n n
n k
n
          
  
       
  
The slope of the social welfare function is:  
 
 
3
2 [ ( 4) ( 12)]
.
( 4)
VIP VIP
c n c nSW
k
n n
   
 
                                                                                      
 
Evaluating this slope at the point where 
*n n  and substituting the zero-profit condition under 
market conditions in (9a), we have  
 
* *
* 3
2 [ ( 4) ( 4)]
0,
( 4)
VIP VIP
c n c nSW
n n
   
 
 
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which is strictly positive.  The strict concavity of the social welfare function implies that 
*n n .  
Thus, under market conditions, entry is socially insufficient.  Further, taking the derivative of 
SW n  with respect to 
VIP
c  yields 
 
* *
* 3
2[ ( 4) 2 ( 4)]
0.
( 4)
VIP
VIP
n c nSW
c n n
     
  
             
 
 
This indicates that if the marginal cost difference between the VIP and entrants increases, the 
strength of the business-creating effect increases, creating a greater degree of insufficient entry.   
                                                                                 
 
 
C-2. Proof of Proposition 2 
 
Using *
i from (8b) and 
*CS from A-1, we calculate 
OPSW as follows: 
 
22 2 2 2
* *
2
( 8 16) ( 24 16) (2 32)
.
8( 4)
VIP
VIPOP
i
n n c n n c n
SW n CS nk
n
 

      
   
                                                         
 
 
Taking the derivative of 
OPSW  with respect to n yields 
 
 
3
2 [ ( 4) ( 4)]
.
( 4)
VIP VIP
OP c n c nSW
k
n n
   
 
                                                                                     
 
 
Evaluating this slope at the point where 
*n n  and substituting the zero-profit condition under 
market conditions in (9a), we have  
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* *
* 3
2 [ ( 4) 2 (3 4)]
0,
( 4)
VIP VIP
OP c n c nSW
n n
   
 
 
         
 
which is strictly positive.  The strict concavity of the social welfare function implies that 
* ˆn n .  
Thus, under market conditions, entry is socially insufficient.  Further, taking the derivative of 
OPSW n   with respect to VIPc  yields 
 
* *
* 3
2[ ( 4) 2 (3 4)]
0.
( 4)
VIP
VIP
OP n c nSW
c n n
     
  
    
 
 
For the case of an open economy, if the marginal cost difference between the VIP and entrants 
increases, the strength of the business-creating effect increases, creating a greater degree of 
insufficient entry.   
 
C-3. Proof of Proposition 3 
 
Making use of firm profits in the open economy case with production subsidies and consumer 
surplus from the following expression, 
 
   
 
     
 
2
**
2
2
4 4 2* 2
8 4
24 3 4 21 1
( ) ,
2 2 2 4 4
VIP VIPVIP
VIP
n c n ns
i
n
c sn c n ns
CS q nq n
n n
      

    
     
  
 
 
we calculate the social welfare function:  
 
OP
iSW n CS   
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             
 
2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2
2
8 16 24 16 8 64 128 12 32 2 32 4 16 12 16
8 4
VIP VIP VIPn n c n n k n n n s n n c n s n n sc n n
n
                 


Taking the derivative of OPSW  with respect to s and setting the resulting expression to zero, we 
solve for the optimal production subsidy rate:  
 
   ** 4 3 4 .
6 16
VIP
n c n
s
n
   


            
 
